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Korean Perspectives on Trade and 
Investment Multilateral Agreements 
and Dispute Resolution1
Moderator: Lucy Reed 
Speakers: E.Y. Park, Joongi Kim, Beomsu Kim & Kevin Kim
Lucy Reed: Welcome back, everybody. We are now moving to investor 
state issues.  The heading of this next [panel is] Korean perspectives on trade 
and investment multilateral agreements and dispute resolution.  I am Lucy 
Reed, and my co-panelists are Professor Joongi Kim from Yonsei Law 
School and Beomsu Kim, who is head of the international arbitration group 
at Shin & Kim.  What is interesting is to see that, as with the panel before 
with E.Y. Park and Kevin Kim, both Joongi and Beomsu are Korean lawyers 
with [a] great deal of experience in the US, practicing law and studying, and 
as Kevin was saying before, this is very common for the international 
arbitration scene, which is a very vibrant one in Korea.  There is a lot of 
cross-pollination and a lot of cross education, and many friendships actually, 
and co-counsel positions in that whole field.  And both of my co-panelists 
are active in the Korean Council of International Arbitration, which was 
mentioned.
1. 7KLV LV D WUDQVFULSW RI WKH VHFRQG RI IRXU SDQHOV IURP WKH ³'LVSXWH 5HVROXWLRQ LQ WKH
.RUHDQ&RPPXQLW\´6\PSRVLXPFR-KRVWHGE\3HSSHUGLQH¶V6WUDXV,QVWLWXWHIRU'LVSXWH5HVROXWLRQ
and the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, which was held March 6, 2015 at Pepperdine 
Law School in Malibu, CA.  This panel was moderated by Lucy Reed, a partner at Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, with presentations from Professor Joongi Kim from Yonsei Law School in 
Seoul, Korea and Beomsu Kim, a partner at Shin & Kim, along with input from previous panelists, 
Kevin Kim, a partner at Bae, Kim & Lee, LLC, and E.Y. Park., a partner at Kim & Chang.  
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What we are going to do is this: We realize that not everybody here will 
be familiar with the basics of what investment treaty arbitration is, so I am 
going to spend ten or fifteen minutes at the most going over some basic 
principles and illustrations of investment treaty arbitration.  Then we will 
hear from Professor Kim on the Korean treaties that exist, and which we 
hope are coming, and then from Beomsu Kim on some of the Korean 
practice in the area, which again is new and robust.  Each will offer you 
some real life stories of some high profile cases that are going on right now, 
and then to wrap up, I am going to list five questions that I posed on this 
topic in 2007²well more than five years ago²and see how the scene has 
changed on investment treaty arbitration in Korea.  We will wrap up with 
that.  We welcome questions and interventions from the audience and from 
the panel at any time.  I of course apologize in advance for those of you who 
know everything about this field and it will seem elementary, so you have 
permission to daydream if you wish.
Why do we even have investment treaties?  The reason is this: Foreign 
investments can obviously be subject to lots of risk.  I have put a few on the 
slide: Civil unrest, exhibit A, Egypt and the number of cases pending 
involving Egypt; fiscal changes, Greece; nationalization of assets²the list is 
too long recently, but I will mention Venezuela and Bolivia; arbitrary and 
discriminatory conduct by the host state²again the list would be extremely 
long, so I can just mention Russia right now.  So investors, whether U.S. or 
Korean or whatever nationality, that have invested in many states in the 
world over the past twenty years are facing a great deal of disruption. What 
an investment treaty does is limit or manage the exposure for foreign 
investors by providing various protections of different types.  And all an 
investment treaty is, is a treaty between two states, if it is bilateral, or many 
states, if its multilateral, in which the host states, welcoming the investment, 
promise to give certain protections to the investors from the other state or 
states in their territory.  For those of you who have not seen an investment 
treaty you would be surprised by how short and simple they are; often no 
more than five to ten pages and they are following various templates at this 
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point. Different governments have different model treaties.  There are three 
basic types²I have mentioned them, bilateral, and multilateral like NAFTA, 
which has three states, or the energy charter treaty.  And then the newest 
area, particularly in Asia, is free trade agreements, which are big trade 
agreements in which there will be one chapter on investment and investment 
protection.  We will be hearing about the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is 
of course again on the front burner, at least for now.
I have put up, so you can read it yourselves, a typical preamble to a 
bilateral investment treaty.  This is the treaty between Korea and the 
Netherlands, which you can see sounds a lot like the old treaties of 
IULHQGVKLS FRPPHUFH DQG QDYLJDWLRQ  6WDWHV VD\ ³:H DUH very good 
friends, and we are friends so that we can promote investment,  one way or 
two ways,  and stimulate the flow of capital, raise the standard of living, etc., 
and we will be sure to treat these investments fairly and equitably (which has 
become quiWH D FDWFK SKUDVH´  6R WKDW LV QRW QHZ LQ GLSORPDF\²the 
inviting of investment and promising to protect.
What is new with investment treaties is that they allow the private 
investor, when there is a dispute over the investment, to bring its own claim 
directly against the host government in international arbitration.  Before this, 
investors were dependent on what we call diplomatic protection or espousal, 
which States do not generally like to do.  For example, when I was in the 
U.S. State Department, and that was in the late eighties, early nineties, I 
worked on one of the very last cases in which the U.S. government espoused 
the claim of a U.S. investor abroad.  We did not win the claim for the 
investor and a lot of diplomatic capital was spent.  So the States would rather 
not be involved with every trade dispute.  They leave it now to the private 
investors.  I really have to underscore what an innovation this is, because in 
public international law disputes are between States and, no matter how 
many treaties they sign, States do not really like having to answer to private 
parties, but that is what is happening in investment treaty arbitrations.  And 
so they come with a great deal of tension, and we should not pretend 
otherwise.
3
Reed et al.: Korean Perspectives on Trade and Investment Multilateral Agreemen
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015
[Vol. 15: 485, 2015] Korean Perspectives on Trade
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
488
The main arbitration options in these treaties are ICSID, which is the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which is a 
World Bank center that administers an arbitration mechanism, which you 
will hear more about, and UNCITRAL, which are ad hoc rules for 
arbitration of disputes now between States and investors.  And the private 
institutions for international arbitration are all competing hard to attract 
investment treaty arbitrations, to which I am known to say again and again 
that be careful about getting what you wish for.  I sound negative²but I 
have been doing this, unlike most people in the field, since the early 80s, and 
they are very complicated cases.  They have not taken politics out of 
arbitration; they are still very political and complex cases, hence my 
warning.
Here is a chart for you from UNCTAD, which shows you that there are 
over 3,000 investment treaties signed.  The grey line is the cumulative 
number.  It is now up to over 3,000.  You can see the biggest rise was in the 
mid-1990s; there were four new treaties a week on average in those years.  
Now it has slowed quite a bit.  The orange, by the way, are bilateral 
investment treaties and the green tips are other ones.  Why has it slowed? It 
has slowed for two reasons: mainly because there are not that many 
permutations of States to enter into treaties anymore and most of them are 
done, and also because a lot of States are losing excitement about entering 
into more treaties.  Back in the early 80s, you can see how few there were, 
so this is a very big change.
There are three things you think about when you deal with arbitrating 
under these treaties.  The first is qualifying criteria.  Who is an investor?  
And basically the treaties are all the same; an investor has to be a natural 
person or a legal person, in the case of the Korea and Netherlands treaty, 
either a Korean or Dutch company.  Sometimes it is not enough to be, say, a 
Korean registered company.  You have to show that you have your 
headquarters and that you are actually carrying out business in Korea.  This 
is something the U.S. government insists on in its treaties²the United States 
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does not protect shelf companies registered in, say, Delaware.  You actually 
have to be doing business in the U.S. to get protection.
What will be protected?  What is an investment?  This is usually a very 
broad definition.  You see here every kind of asset, owned or controlled²
controlled is important²directly or indirectly, by an investor of one state 
against the other.  Lots of ink has been spilled on what is direct and indirect 
control in this area and the treaties can vary quite a bit.  What is not 
covered?  A contract.  A simple contract right is not an investment.  If you 
have a contract with a Korean government purchaser, say for paperclips, and 
it is breached you do not have an investment treaty against the government 
of Korea.
I call your attention just to the penultimate bullet here: an indirect claim 
by a partial shareholder under most treaties is a qualifying claim.  One of the 
earliest cases we did was for CMS Energy against Argentina, which was the 
first of the cases against Argentina after their economic crisis.  CMS Energy 
owned less than a quarter of the shares in the relevant Argentina pipeline 
company, but ultimately was awarded compensation for the unfair and 
inequitable treatment of its interest in that pipeline.
What are the substantive protections?  We all know there can be no 
expropriation of your investment without compensation.  Fair and equitable 
treatment²you are not supposed to be whipped around by the government, 
treating you well one day and less well another day.  You are not supposed 
to be discriminated against as compared to the locals or other national 
investors, and you are entitled to receive full protection and security, 
particularly when there is disruption.
Most important are procedural rights under the treaties.  We have 
already talked about this. You have direct recourse to arbitration with the 
KRVW6WDWH7KRVHRI\RXZKRVWXG\DUELWUDWLRQDQGPD\VD\³LW¶VVXSSRVHG
to be consHQVXDOKRZGRHVWKLVZRUN"´7KHWUHDW\LVDVWDQGLQJFRQVHQWIRU
the State to arbitrate with an investor.  The investor triggers that consent 
with a claim when there is an alleged dispute.  There are cooling off periods 
to try to get States and investors talking, though this almost never leads to 
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settlement.  A very interesting and growing topic is how we can make 
inroads into settlement or mediation of these disputes.
I will go very quickly through the next slides.  ICSID is the single 
biggest arbitration avenue for investment treaty arbitrations, based on a 
Convention that has about 160 countries signed up to resolve their 
investment disputes peacefully using this mechanism.  It is important that 
ICSID is detached from national courts, so the New York Convention does 
not matter at all.  There is an annulment process for ICSID awards, with 
factors similar to those in the New York Convention, but it is all internal to 
ICSID.  Generally international law does not float unconnected to national 
territories, but in ICSID it actually does; it is a free floating system.  This 
map shows you all the countries that have ratified the ICSID Convention.  
They are the blues.  The yellow countries are those where there has been a 
signature but not a ratification yet.  This graph, you can see very quickly, 
shows the increase in arbitration cases registered in ICSID, with the big 
increase starting in the early 2000s against Argentina, Venezuela, and the 
Czech Republic.  For a long time, to work at ICSID meant only one or two
cases a year, but now they are very busy.
This pie chart is interesting, in that it shows you the geographical 
breakdown of ICSID cases.  The big purple piece is Central Asia at 24% and 
the pink or light purple is South and East Asia at 8%.  So that is a total of 
32% of ICSID cases with a geographical connection to Asia.  But look at 
this pie chart.  This is the distribution of appointments of arbitrators in 
ICSID cases.  The orange piece is for arbitrators from Southeast Asia and 
the Pacific at 11%, and to the right the tiny purple one is arbitrators from 
Eastern Europe combined with Central Asia at 2%, so only 13% of all 
arbitrators come from Asia²despite the 32% of cases with geographic 
connection to Asia.  This is a very big topic that we all continue to discuss.
This slide is important for those who think there are good reasons why 
States do not want to be bound by ICSID anymore, because investors are 
getting away with murder.  This shows you ICSID cases only, and not other 
investment treaty arbitrations.  The big purple piece of pie covers awards 
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upholding the claims of investors against all States.  48% of investors win, 
and obviously 52% do not win, so it is not all pro investor.  The red piece 
indicates cases that die at the jurisdiction phase, for example for lack of a 
qualified investor or investment.  And the green piece covers the outright 
dismissals on the merits against States. So do keep this in mind when you 
are talking to taxi drivers in Seoul, who are against the TPP.
Another thing to keep in mind: the number of investment treaties that a 
State has entered into does not necessarily have a connection to how many 
arbitrations the State may get involved in.  So you can see on this chart that 
China has over 100 investment treaties, but China has only one ICSID 
arbitration.  South Korea has 57 BITs²the number has probably changed a 
little²and, when I did this chart from ICSID data, there was only one 
pending and one concluded ICSID arbitration.  A couple more Korean cases 
are in the pipeline, we hear.  But look at Venezuela²only 24 treaties but 
almost 50 cases.  So it is not dependent on the number of treaties.
This slide includes statistics for all known investment treaty cases, 
ICSID and others, and it shows that States are successful in 60% of the cases 
brought against them.  This includes UNCITRAL cases that are public (they 
are not all public).  The total is 176 awards.  And the investor claimants do 
not get what they ask for.  In cases where the claimant wins, the average 
damages claimed are about $166 million (USD), but the claimants are 
awarded only $76 million.  This is a big reduction from what is claimed, for 
different reasons²less than 50%.  There are some outliers, including a 
couple of big awards like the Yukos award against Russia at $50 billion.
To conclude, I have given three or four talks in my career, in Korea or 
involving Korea, about investor state arbitration and the TPP, starting in 
around 2005, ten years ago.  I pulled out some slides I had used in 2007, I 
think it was with one of the Korean government programs, and reminded 
myself that I ended that talk by listing the questions that were on my mind as 
an experienced investment treaty arbitration advocate about what Korea 
might face.  Here is the list, which we will return to: Will there be cases?  
How will the Korean government defend cases?  How will Korean investors 
7
Reed et al.: Korean Perspectives on Trade and Investment Multilateral Agreemen
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015
[Vol. 15: 485, 2015] Korean Perspectives on Trade
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
492
prosecute cases?  Are they going to use international or local expertise or 
both, and what will be seeing?  Will it be primarily international and treaty 
law or local law or both?
With that I am going to turn it over to Professor Joongi Kim to talk more 
about South Korea and its treaties.
Joongi Kim: While we are waiting for the slides, I want to thank Jack 
and Tom, and everyone else at the Pepperdine Law School for inviting me.
It is a great honor and pleasure to be here.
Lucy gave a very comprehensive and great overview of investment 
arbitration.  And what I will try to do is try to add some Korean flavor to it, 
and give you a more in-depth perspective of what is going on in Korea.
One of the few things that I think I got pretty close to being right²but
my wife will say that I never get anything right of course²is what I 
predicted a couple years ago. I did an article reviewing the potential of 
Asian investors bringing cases.  And, what I did among other things was I 
plotted various things.  What you have to have if you want an investment 
treaty case²an investment arbitration case²is you have to have investors 
that are investing a lot overseas.  Koreans do that.  Second, what I thought 
was important was, you have to have a lot of arbitration experience.  And, as 
we know from our pioneering counsel here in this room, Korean counsel and 
Korean clients have been very, very active in commercial arbitration. So
they have a very solid foundation in how arbitration works.  So we have that 
in Korea.  I thought, therefore, we have those two factors and not many 
countries have those two things.  So I felt that it is going to happen in Korea.  
And lo and behold, as we saw, we actually have this increase in cases and I 
will try to shed some light on that.
What I did [in this slide], among other things, is I tried to highlight some 
of the cases that are being brought in Asia.  These are some of the major 
cases in Asia that have been brought recently.  And, as you see, the 
nationalities of course can vary. And I will talk about that in a second, but, 
for instance, you have this very famous case involving Phillip Morris 
bringing a case against Australia concerning plain packaging cigarettes.  
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They did this actually through a BIT²a bilateral investment treaty²
between Hong Kong and Australia.  So they actually deliberately did this by 
design.  And you see here [in this slide], we have two cases against Korea.  
We know the first one involving Lone Star, and then we have found out last 
week that an Iranian investor has filed a trigger letter against Korea.  This is 
apparently not an ICSID case, and the details have just been announced so 
we are still waiting to see what is involved, but this is actually another very 
surprising development, that investors are bringing cases against Korea. And 
as you see there, the case is . . . 
Audience: Why is that surprising?
Joongi Kim: Well, that is a good question.
Audience: I am not surprised. We are in the mix.
Joongi Kim: We are in the mix.  As a developed country, I guess I kind 
of was, a bit maybe, over-confident in the rule of law in Korea.  And I guess 
I thought, you know, the Korean system, we have a good rule of law, courts 
are very good and efficient, and the process is very transparent and neutral, 
so investors should probably be content with the process that exists and 
would not have to resort to this very expensive process.  But as my wife 
DOZD\V WHOOVPH ,¶YH EHHQ SURYHn wrong again.  We will see.  There are 
scenarios that I will explore where I think there is potential, where Korea 
actually is vulnerable.
As Lucy pointed out, in Korea, again very similarly, we have bilateral 
investment treaties, and multilateral investment treaties.  [Slide] The big 
shift in Korea is, we have shifted from adding what we call investment 
arbitration, the ISDS, Investor State Dispute Settlement, from BITs, and now 
we are shifting more to FTAs, and this will come up in a second.  So in 
terms of numbers, as of March 2015, we have actually eighty-eight bilateral 
investment treaties.  And that actually includes not a bilateral investment 
treaty, but a trilateral investment treaty between China, Japan, and Korea.  
And now, this is interesting, because this is, as you see there [in the slide],
the second most in Asia; very, very aggressive in Asia.  You do not see 
Japan there.  You do not see any other major Asian country other than 
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China.  So recently Koreans, the Foreign Ministry, and the Korean 
government, have been very, very forthright in trying to push for BITs, 
primarily for Korean investors when they invest overseas.
In terms of FTAs, we have nine FTAs with investor state arbitration 
provisions, and three are in the works.  The three are with China²we are in 
the final stages of finalizing and ratifying an FTA with China, and it came 
out last week, and also includes an ISDS provision²and with New Zealand, 
and Columbia.  So we have a total of twelve FTAs in the works that embrace 
investment arbitration as a means to settle investment disputes.  And, as 
Lucy mentioned, we have TPP.  We only have a leaked draft of TPP that 
came out three years ago.  So of course if anyone in this room has any more 
knowledge, I would be very, very interested to hear about that.
If we look at the treaties in force [slide], you see how the numbers have 
changed, and you have this big jump between the 1990s and the 2000s.  It is 
a very similar jump as you saw the total numbers that Lucy showed earlier.  
So Korea basically followed that trend very actively.  And here, [the slide] 
illustrates those numbers even more.  So you see those big blocks in the 90s 
and the 2000s.  That is where you had this huge upsurge in BITs and FTAs 
with these investment arbitration provisions.  And, one thing we want to 
note is, you see the light blue line at the top [of the slide], and those
represent a huge number of BITs and FTAs with South and East Asian and 
Pacific countries.  So that has been a very important area for us that we have 
been focusing on.
Now this [slide] is the same thing but based on the region.  And why I 
did this was, it gives you a flavor of how things have changed.  So if you 
look at the bottom, which is the light pink and the red, it goes from the 60s 
to the 70s to the 90s and 2000s.  You had this shift in focus.  Basically as 
E.Y. mentioned earlier, Korea was a very poor country.  So what did we 
need?  We needed capital.  So a lot of our BITs came from, for instance, 
Western European countries where we needed capital from.  Then, the focus
started to shift, because we were no longer an FDI importer, but we became 
more of an FDI exporter.  So, therefore, we branched out, and we needed 
10
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FTAs in other regions of the world for our investors, where we were 
investing all over the world, because, our investors, the Korean government 
felt that our investors needed protection.
So, two perspectives to keep in mind: There is the sovereign 
perspective, then there is the investor perspective. Sovereigns usually must 
prepare for claims against them. So from the sovereign perspective, Korea is 
really undergoing a baptism by fire.  We are learning right now, with this 
very huge case that is brought against us, and we have another case in the 
works.  So this builds institutional experience.  Two countries come to mind:
Argentina, as Lucy mentioned, and the other one is Iran, and they have 
extensive experience through the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, where 
Jack and Lucy both have experience.  So their governments have extensive 
experience in investment arbitration, and you would not have expected they 
would.  They are very sophisticated and they know what is going on because 
they have so much experience.  Similarly, the Korean government, therefore, 
is gaining this type of experience right now.
Where I see the vulnerabilities²this is what I had expected actually, 
more so than this current case²is regional governments within Korea.  Our 
central government is very sophisticated, and they are generally sensitive to 
investor needs and rights, but in the regional governments in Korea, there is 
intense competition to get investments. Often under questionable terms, they 
will engage in projects to try to attract investment and there is I think a lot of 
vulnerability.  So we expected that there might be more claims that would be 
brought because of things that had happened in the regional governments.
Another area, and this has actually already happened, is contract claims.  
So treaty claims are through the treaty, and that is the bulk of most 
investment arbitration claims, but there are also pure contract claims; you 
can have a pure contract and ask for a venue, such as ICSID or ICC.  It is 
basically the same thing.  And we actually had a very large, almost a billion 
dollar claim, brought against one of our regional governments, that was an 
ICC contract claim.  But basically it was an investment arbitration.
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As with many cases, and this is the difficulty that lies if you are a 
sovereign, it is very difficult to settle, even though many times it makes 
more sense to settle, because of the political implications, you cannot just 
accept the risk.  Some may question, ³How come you settled for 100 million 
dollars?´ Which maybe was a good deal, but then you could still be held 
accountable.  Who knows, maybe it could have been fifty; maybe it could 
have been $200 million.  Therefore, governments are in a very difficult 
position, so a lot of times they cannot settle, even though in a commercial 
situation a commercial party usually might.
So from the investor perspective, Korean investors²and this is what I 
think I had somewhat predicted²need various things as I mentioned.  You 
need critical mass, you need a sizable amount of investors investing 
overseas, you need able counsel, and you need able in-house counsel.  Able 
in-house FRXQVHO FDQ WHOO WKHLU &(2V ³You know we have a lot of 
experience with commercial arbitration, and it is basically a very similar 
thing²we were denied certain rights and we could bring a claim.  This is a 
V\VWHPWKDWZRUNV´$QGWKHQIRUD&(2RUXSSHU managers who have that 
H[SHULHQFH WKH\FDQVD\ ³2KPD\EHZHVKRXOG WU\ WKDW´ 7KHQZHKDYH
what I call the Se Ri Park or the Yuna Kim effect.  And we might add, for 
those of us in the room that know him, the Shin Hi-Taek2 effect as well.  
What I mean by this is, in Korea, as you know, Se Ri Park, is a legendary 
figure; out of nowhere, she comes and wins this major championship, and 
now we have this whole floodgate of phenomenal female golfers all over the 
world.  And Yuna Kim is the same thing.  Just one person can change it.  If 
she can do it, I can do it.  And I think that is very important, that kind of 
confidence.  I think we have this now, basically, oQWKHLQYHVWRUVLGH³+H\
that investor brought a case when their rights were violatedZK\FDQ¶t we do 
LW"´ $QG LWNLQGRIEUHDNV WKH LFHDQGEUHDNV WKHPROGDQG, WKLQN WKDW LV
2. Professor Hi-Taek Shin, Biography, ARBITRATION ACADEMY,
http://www.arbitrationacademy.org/?page_id=3073 (last visited May ³>3URIHVVRU+L-Taek 
Shin] is currently on the panel of arbitrators of ICSID . . . as well as the Korea Commercial 
$UELWUDWLRQ%RDUG´
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why, from this perspective, it kind of allays the concerns that many investors 
previously had.
And this is actually the case that Kevin briefly mentioned that was 
handled by .HYLQ¶VILUPZKLFKWLHGDVWDQGDUGFRPPHUFLDOGLVSXWHZLWKDQ
investment treaty dispute.  Kevin elaborated on it so I will not expand on it 
anymore, but it is a very interesting case where it kind of crosses both 
aspects of commercial arbitration with investment arbitration.  What I will 
do now is briefly overview some of the key areas that might be of interest to 
you, that are common in many of the BITs and FTAs that Korea has.
As Lucy explained, these are the primary forums where investment 
disputes are settled. First, ICSID.  I like ICSID for one big reason among 
other things: we are the same age.  I was just celebrating their birthday last 
week in DC.  ICSID is the primary institution, but we have other institutions.  
You can have, and there are, as Suzanne would of course explain, but the 
ICC has investment arbitration cases.  PCA is another forum.  The Yukos 
claim, the 50 billion dollar investment treaty claim²the largest in history²
was at the PCA.
Audience: And that is? [referring to PCA]
Joongi Kim: Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague.  It used to 
primarily deal with a lot of state-to-state disputes, but they now maintain a
very active docket of investment treaty disputes as well.  And as we saw, the 
largest case in history was held there.
We have in our BITs, amicus curiae provisions.  This would be a 
provision for someone not directly involved in the dispute. There are certain 
qualifications that they must have, but they can actually file a submission, 
and they can also actually present²make oral submissions²as well. This 
exists in KORUS, Korea¶s FTA with the US, and in TTP in the leak draft 
that we know of.  Interestingly, but maybe perhaps not surprisingly, in the 
Korea-China FTA we do not have the amicus curiae provisions.
Then we have transparency provisions.  There is a big push right now in 
investment arbitration²international treaty arbitration is kind of a branch of 
general commercial arbitration²but because there is a public aspect that we 
13
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should increase transparency.  The KORUS FTA, which follows the model 
US BIT, has very extensive transparency provisions.  So almost everything, 
including submissions are disclosed, and hearings themselves are supposed 
to be public, which is something you do not think of in your standard 
commercial arbitration, where parties treasure privacy and confidentiality.  
The TPP²also in the leak draft²contains a very similar provision.  
However, perhaps again not surprisingly, in the China-Korea FTA we do not 
have this transparency provision.
And this is just an interesting thing I dug up, in terms of language²and 
I know the Korean negotiators are very proud of this²because if there is a 
dispute under KORUS or KAFTA, which is the Korea-Australia FTA, 
Korean has to be used, with English as well, unless the parties decide 
otherwise. The Korean-Canada FTA is also very interesting.  If the disputing 
party²the sovereign getting sued²is Korea, then things proceed in Korean 
and English.  And if Canada is being sued, it has to be in French and 
English.  We do not have this in other treaties.
And then, another thing that is very unique, that exists in the Korea-
Canada FTA, and also probably because influenced by our Canadian friends, 
is this corporate social responsibility provision, which you do not really see 
that often.  But Canada is very active in promoting this.  It is just a general 
statement that countries should encourage enterprises to follow 
internationally recognized standards of corporate social responsibility, and 
then these principles address things such as labor, environment, human 
rights, corruption, and community relations.  This is not something you 
normally see in many treaties, but this has been added in the Korea-Canada 
FTA and it exists in the draft for the TPP.
Lucy Reed: There are two things your presentation prompts me to say.  
The first is on language, which is very interesting.  Language is one of the 
biggest sources of expense in investment treaty arbitration, as well as in 
commercial arbitration.  We represented the Republic of Turkey in three 
ICSID and ICSID Additional Facility cases under the Energy Charter Treaty, 
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all of which Turkey won.  One called Libananco3 was brought by an alleged 
Cypriot investor in Turkey.  As Cyprus and Turkey do not even have 
diplomatic relations, it was a bit suspicious.  The other two were brought by 
alleged Polish investors.  At the end of the day we were able to prove for the 
Republic of Turkey that the claimants were members of a Turkish family, 
now all under Interpol notices and fugitives, who had based their claims of 
being Cypriot and Polish investors at a critical point of time on fraudulent 
documents and testimony.  We received what was, then, the biggest award of 
costs and fees at ICSID, roughly $ 15 million in Libananco.  A great
percentage of that amount was for translation and interpretation costs, 
because the proceedings were in English only.  And because this company, 
Libananco, was just a shell company in Cyprus, there were no funds to pay 
the costs award.
The second thing I want to mention, for your general knowledge in this 
area²and I do not know if Beomsu Kim plans to touch on it²is that in the 
past fifteen years we have seen a big change in how investment treaties 
drafted.  The modern model BITs put a greater emphasis on corporate social 
responsibility, and carve out more robust regulatory room for the host 
6WDWHV¶LQDUHDVVXFKDVHQYLURQPHQWDQGSXEOLFKHDOWK6WDWHVIROORZLQJWKH
US model BIT are reacting to cases like the Phillip Morris case, where the 
claimant is challenging the mandatory plain packaging of cigarettes in 
Australia on the alleged basis of an interference with their intellectual 
property rights in their branding that is taken off the packages.  States are 
getting much more self-protective.  And the area of unfair and inequitable 
regulatory treatment of investors, especially with indirect control of the 
investment, is being defined much more clearly.  So, what I often say in Asia 
when I face a lot of doubters about the TPP or FTAs, is to remember just 
how much has been learned, remember we are way high on the learning 
curve for both investors and states.  It is a different era.  With that, onto 
Beomsu Kim for experiences in practice in this area.
3. Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8.
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Beomsu Kim: Lucy, thank you very much for your kind introduction.  
Before going further I want to repeat a big thanks to Professor Coe and 
Pepperdine University for providing this great opportunity.  I have 
postulated kind of mixed feelings this morning because, as Kevin 
mentioned, we are just Korean born people and quite local lawyers²local 
kind of legal professionals²and we have never felt we were [making an 
impact] outside of Korea.  Also I am here, and Kevin is here, everyone is 
here talking about international mess involving some Korean flavors and 
some Korean things, but not purely on Korean matters; things just happen to 
be in Korea, but the same thing may happen everywhere.  So I realize that 
the legal profession, or lawyers, can do whatever they are supposed to do on 
behalf of someone else, regardless of whether it is in Korea or [elsewhere].  I 
am supposed to talk about some practices as a practitioner in Korea now, but 
it probably relates to generally everywhere in the current world.
I will briefly talk about some sentiments we had at the time of the 
KORUS FTA or involving the KORUS FTA, but I would like to mention 
some realities we have, regardless of the fears of additions, or concerns 
related to the FTA or across FTA.  And I am going to talk about how the 
Korean petitioners have prepared, or how Korean government has prepared 
for the ISDS.  And then why we need this BIT and why we need all these 
kinds of things as of now and how to develop this new era going forward, 
and then I would like to make to some kind of personal conclusion²or kind 
of some expectations or suspicions based on some prior experiences.
This morning I read an article about some statements made by Senator 
Elizabeth Warren in the US.  She really criticized and opposed the ISDS and 
list to the TTP or FTA context.  She criticized how unfair the proceeding is, 
how the taxpayers over here are suffering, and how the non-neutrality is 
being opposed by this system.  That reminded me back to 2007 when we 
entered into KORUS FTA.  We saw that there was a big demonstration on 
the streets every day and night and there was so much anti-American 
sentiment that arose at the time.  And that was back in 2007.  Again in 2012, 
when the KORUS FTA came into effect, there was another series of 
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demonstrations on the street almost every day and night.  Politicians, civil 
groups, and intellectuals really made a statement, and they opposed 
[strongly], and as Kevin mentioned, a number judges really opposed to this 
ISD being [put into] effect in Korea, but, fortunately or unfortunately, we 
have the FTA being placed in Korea today.  And the same is going on today 
as well; the continued opposition and pressures to renegotiate about the 
Korea-US FTA and the ISDS.
As we have discussed this morning, we have around 100 BITs and 
FTAs, but why this ISDS is so critical in [the] Korea-US FTA is because 
everybody fears that some American investors are ready to, or are quite 
diligent to, make claims against the Korean government, which could, at the 
end of the day, directly or indirectly affect the Korean people.  That is why, 
in my personal view, the demonstrations are going on regarding the entering 
of this Korean/US FTA as well as the reorganization of the Korea-US FTA.  
So we will see how this will go.
Regardless of this opposition, or fears or concerns or criticisms, we are 
having quite a different reality seen in Korea now, especially for this current 
government²Park administration²[which] has [a] really broad plan to 
make the FDI inward clear bound investment increase because the clear 
bound FDI wants a big drive to make economic development in Korea.  And 
we are realizing that we are very low on the FDI in terms of absolute 
numbers and in terms of relative GDP in the OECD countries.  We have 
one-fifth of the U.K. in terms of the GDP relatives, and one-ninth or one-
tenth of the U.K. in terms of absolute numbers when talking about the 
amount of Korea-bound FDI.  I will talk later about the FDI, as Professor 
Kim mentioned.
Korean officials need to invest abroad, and that is why we need another 
protection from the BIT or FTA regime to protect the Korean 
Commissioners.  So in reality, we need these kinds of BIT and FTAs put in 
place for Korea-bound investment, and at the same time, for foreign-bound 
investment made by Korean investors.  With this current situation, the Park 
administration made a big amendment to the Foreign Investment Promotion 
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Act so that the Korean government can attract more foreign investors to 
come into Korea to make investments so that the Korean economy can make 
another leap up with these new investments.  At the same time, the Park 
administration issued a kind of report, which is describing the general 
policies and measures to promote and encourage foreign investors to come 
into Korea.  One of the incentives is to provide tax incentives and some 
other of the original or facility incentives so that many foreign investors can 
come into Korea and make investments again.  That is the current situation 
we are in now.
At the same time, as Professor Kim mentioned, the Korean companies 
have been making huge amounts of investments into other countries as well.  
Data shows that the outward-FDIs exceeded by threefold to the Korea-bound 
foreign investment, which means Koreans are quite diligent in making 
investments in foreign countries, including some South Asian, West Asian,
and Middle Eastern countries, along with America.  So those really 
prompted the Korean government to put some protective measures in place, 
not only for the investors, but for Korean companies, too.  That is why the 
data is changing, but we have about 100 BITs and FTAs as of now.  My data 
shows 103 BITs and FTAs, but about 100 BITs and FTAs are in place 
[currently].  Thus, Korea is second to China in nation countries.  We have 
been inviting foreigners to come into Korea to make investments, and at the 
same time, we have been promoting Korean companies to go abroad to make 
investments into other regions and to expand our markets.  The Korean 
economy is making another step upward with those investments.  With these 
FTAs and BITs, as Lucy mentioned, there is very extensive investment 
chapter in this FTA.  The FTA is the big Bible about transactions between 
two countries or multiple countries.  One of the chapters is the investment 
chapter, and one of the very important subchapters is the investment state 
dispute mechanisms.  So the Korea-China FTA has such investment chapters 
with investment state dispute mechanism as well.  And Korea had the same 
RQH WRR$QGZHZLOOVHHPDQ\PRUH WRFRPHLQUHODWLRQWR.RUHD¶VODWHVW
transactions, too.
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I am going to briefly talk about how Korea has prepared for this ISDS.  
We do not have any central agency to be the [center] for all ISD matters.  
Instead, the Korean government has had the ad hoc approach, so that some 
late agencies form a committee or a task force, [where] the members of the 
task force prepare the expenses and all the related proceedings.  But, as 
Professor Kim mentioned, Korea may change this approach on how to plan 
or how to address this ISDS system going forward because if more cases 
arise, then the government might need to prepare and address those issues in 
a more consistent way.  So the Korean government probably will answer the 
question of how to prevent the dispute and how to address the dispute in a 
way of having a centralized agency or some other creative ways down the 
road.
As of today, although we do not have a centralized agency, various 
government agencies and interest groups have prepared for this ISDS.  The 
Supreme Court has formed a group through research as to what ISDS is and 
how the ISDS will affect the Korean judicial system because, as Kevin 
mentioned, maybe some judicial decisions may be subject to the ISDS 
system depending on the situation, so that is why the Korean judges are 
really kind of sensitive to this ISDS system and that is why they have 
formed a group to research what ISDS is, [and] how ISDS will affect the 
Korean Judiciary.  At the same time, the Minister of Justice (MOJ) has been 
doing the central role to prepare the ISDS programs and it has reached an 
ISDS committee, comprising of all the government officials, and professors, 
and practitioners, and some specialists as the members for this committee.  
And the MOJ has co-organized the ISD forum with the Korean Commercial 
Arbitration Board (KCAB), where practitioners, professors, and officials 
have regularly met to discuss and exchange views and information about 
ISDS cases, regimes, and new developments.  That is really helpful for the 
Korean practitioners to have very updated and very detailed valuation 
experience to share among these practitioners.  And of course the 
practitioners, like myself, have studied ISD jurisprudence for years.  And as 
*UDQWPHQWLRQHGRQFH.RUHDQVDUHHQJDJHGZHGR\RXNQRZ³EDOLEDOL´
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very, you know, in a hurry so we have been very diligent to learn a lot 
within a very short period of time.  So, we try to make ourselves ready to 
respond or address ISDS issues when it is necessary.  That is what we have 
done [thus far], and at the same time, we are learning a lot from international 
counsel in prominent positions, like Lucy, and from other great firms and 
lawyers, and trying to make our lawyers similar to them.  We have been 
quite diligent to do this.  At the same time we have very strong civic group 
to prompt the lawyers or some interest group to be ready for this ISD 
systems.  So they really asked the legal professionals to prepare themselves 
with this ISDS systems and development.
Up to this slide I have talked about how the Korean government has 
viewed the BITs and FTAs and how Korean practitioners or interest groups 
have prepared this ISDS system.  But my personal view is that as time goes 
by there [will be] more cases coming against the Korean government, 
fortunately or unfortunately, because Korean governments, including both 
the central and local governments, invited a lot of foreign investment, 
directly or indirectly.  Thus, naturally, Korean governments, local and 
central, anticipate that conflicts with foreign investors will increase.  It is 
quite natural that the more transactions, the bigger the possibility of conflict 
will arise from these transactions or relations.  With all the experiences, 
knowledge, and information, it seems that the Korean government has 
viewed BITs and FTAs to correlate to the investment, inward or outward, 
and interestingly, they have kind of viewed that the FTA flows in Korea 
have been significantly increasing since the Korea-EU FTA has been in 
effect. As of now the EU, China, U.S., and Japan are four major trade 
partners with Korean companies and Korean government.  The Korean 
government has viewed that with all these BITs, FTAs, and transaction 
investments among those countries, the Korean government insists that we 
need a system to respond to this ISDS system and to address these kinds of 
matters in another proper way.  Quite interestingly, this month the Minister 
of Justice published this book, unfortunately it is in Korean only, but they 
have very diligently researched and prepared how to prepare, from the 
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Korean perspective, for the ISDS to come.  It is a really good guideline for 
Korean practitioners to follow.  It is a quite interesting book, so if you are 
interested you can find good references and good directions from the Korean 
government from this book.
This is my personal view [regarding whether] BITs or FTAs have the 
potential to be the basis for another ISDS case.  My personal view is that the 
BITs between Korea and EU member states may be the big potential . . . for 
the future of ISDS cases.  And as Kevin [mentioned], the Korea-China BIT 
or Korea-China FTA may be another basis in taking into account all the 
transaction volumes and the transaction natures being made with the Korean 
investors, as well as Chinese investors in Korea because we have a lot of 
transactions between the two.  So those BITs and FTAs may be the potential 
basis for future ISDS cases from the Korean perspective.
With all of this, I was about to show a kind of chart for this.  This [slide 
shows] a summary chart of the complaints filed by foreign investors with the 
Korea Trades Agency Ombudsman System.  So I highlighted²there are a 
lot²but I did find some items having more than 5% ratio to the cases.  You 
will see the investment incentives, like the complaint, complained of activity 
of investment systems and procedures and taxation and so on.  These are 
quite telling because, you will see this, I am looking for the Lone Star 
against Korean government for the first ICSID proceeding, now against 
Kevin.  For the Lone Star case this piece arose in relation to the investment 
system procedure as well as taxation.  As you have seen, the complaint 
related to the investment systems and procedures and taxations are taking 
very high positions compared to the other items.  It is quite interesting to see 
from this perspective.  At the same time, as we have heard, a new case by 
the Iranian investor has lead again to the investment systems and procedures 
because²my understanding is that²the investor wanted to make an 
investment, but for some reason the transfer did not go through, and that is 
why the union investor filed or encouraged Korean government to have this 
ISD case.  It is also related to this investment system and procedure.  And 
the next bullet point [on the slide], the particular significance is that the 
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Korean government itself acknowledged or saw that it needs to improve 
foreseeability of government policies throughout the IFDI, which means that 
[the] Korean government saw that there was some gray area to be improved 
in relation to this investment regime because it may give some 
unforeseeability for the foreign investors; it may cause some complaints 
filed by foreign investors, [and] later on it may develop into another dispute 
between Korean government and foreign investors.  So it is quite useful to 
follow which areas that Korean-bound foreign investors have been feeling 
uncomfortable [about].  So those are my personal views²that the Korean 
government must really view those systems or as a regime, you know, to 
reduce the possibilities or probabilities of future ISD cases.  That is all I 
have today, thank you very much.  Thank you.
Lucy Reed: I have asked Professor Kim to tell you briefly about the 
case that nobody has known about until now.
Joongi Kim: This is a very interesting case that no one knows about and 
it is the first case where a Korean investor actually obtained an award.  I do 
not know if it is the first case that was filed, but it is, from what we know,
the first case where an investor received an award.  The basic facts are this.
There is a treaty²that even Lucy Reed does not know about²called the 
Moscow Convention, and if anyone knows about this treaty I would really 
welcome their input.  I have asked several experts in Russia about this treaty.  
It is basically a treaty involving about four or five CIS countries.  And this 
treaty has a very unique provision that allows investors from non-member 
states of the treaty. The investment treaty is basically for investors from the 
member states of the treaty, but it allows for investors of non-member states 
to bring a case against a country that is party to the treaty.  There is 
apparently a Korean investor, apparently a real estate developer, and he 
brought a case against Kyrgyzstan at a very not that well known arbitral 
institution in Moscow, and he obtained an arbitral award through this treaty.  
Not a small claim, about²I think²$10 million.  And there are several other 
investors that brought claims under this treaty, and won awards.  The award 
is currently being challenged in Moscow courts, and apparently there is a 
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similar, parallel case where that award was set aside.  So there is a likelihood 
that the award might be set aside, but for whatever it is worth, it is the first 
investment award by a Korean investor.
Lucy Reed: So, any questions at this point from the audience for this 
panel?
Audience: Who are the parties for the Moscow treaty?
Joongi Kim: I do not know exactly, but, if I recall correctly, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and several other²four or five²CIS countries.  Not 
that many.
Audience: Mr. Beomsu Kim, you mentioned nine Lone Star Cases?  
Most of the transactions that Korea did were sometime in 1997 during the 
financial crisis, but the Korea-US FTA and the Korea FTA with EU took
place sometime in 2012, so how are they able to invoke this ISD?
Beomsu Kim: I should probably make some corrections if it was 
unclear before, but Lone Star cases involved a U.S. investment company, but 
the ISD was invoked based on not the Korea-US FTA or Korea-US BIT, but 
instead, is based on Korea-Belgium BIT, which has been in effect since the 
mid-70s, so the invocation of the BIT is not the Korea-US FTA or the 
Korea-EU FTA.
Lucy Reed: It would be worth spending a few minutes explaining and 
GHVFULELQJWKH/RQH6WDUFDVHIRUWKRVHZKRGRQ¶WNQRZLWEHFDXVHLWLVVXFK
a touchstone of a case.
Beomsu Kim: We have discussed today that since 1997, Korea, in a 
meaningful sense, has become a member of the international community.  
Before that, Korea was, as someone called it, a hermit kingdom; we were a 
very distant and small country.  However, it was hit hard by the Asian 
financial crisis, together with Thailand and some other Asian countries in 
1996 and 1997.  That really prompted Korea to become a member of the 
international community, and after the financial crisis, many Korea-bound 
investments were made²which were sometimes fortunate and sometimes 
unfortunate.  With this flood of Korea-bound investments, many bankrupt 
companies were revived and the Korean economy flourished²particularly 
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since 1999 and 2000.  With this, the Lone Star, a private equity fund, made 
huge investments into a Korean bank, which nearly went bankrupt in early 
2000.  Lone Star made a huge investment, and it took a longer time to make 
an exit from such an investment, so that really made the basis for a claim 
against the Korean government.  That case is really the first case against the 
Korean government with a huge claim amount of $4.5 billion.  Before the 
Yukos case, the Lone Star case was the biggest ICSID case in terms of the 
claim amount to the extent of my knowledge.  And that proceeding started in 
2012, based on the Korea-Belgium BIT, and is still on-going.
Lucy Reed: Just to add, because counsel cannot say too much, a couple 
of things.  The existence of ICSID disputes is always public.  The World 
Bank has a website listing all the cases filed and a brief procedural history of 
each, not the content usually.  UNCITRAL and other cases are not always 
publicly known until the awards come out, if at all.  This is one of the 
reasons for the inexact data.  We know about Lone Star, because it is an 
ICSID case and, as I understand from public sources, the theory is that Lone 
Star wanted to get out of its investment and was not allowed to, and over 
time, the investment lost a great deal of value.  You said how many billion?
Beomsu Kim: 4.5 billion.
Lucy Reed: I am not involved, but it must involve claims of unfair and 
inequitable treatment, maybe indirect expropriation, maybe umbrella clause.  
It is the focus of a lot of attention.
Audience: Just a quick follow up on that²so once there is an 
arbitration award, how does the collection happen?
Lucy Reed: That is a good question.  It is one that we as counsel who 
represent investors ask before we start a case²what will happen if you win 
an award?  Until the Argentina cases, virtually all States that had lost in 
ICSID arbitration²generally they were contract disputes selecting ICSID 
arbitration²voluntarily paid.  If not paid voluntarily, the investor must 
resort to the provision in the ICSID Convention that says that any signatory 
State of the ICSID convention is to  enforce ICSID awards in its  national 
courts as if they were final judgments of their highest courts²so there is no 
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opportunity to review on the merits.  This avenue has not yet been actually 
tested in a highly disputed ICSID award.  Also, as in commercial arbitration, 
we often see that after a treaty award comes out there is negotiation of the 
amount.  Again, there are interesting developments in the field.  There are 
hedge funds that buy unpaid ICSID awards at some discount, lump them 
together if there are multiple awards (as there have been against Argentina), 
and then negotiate for payment.  Argentina recently paid off the five or six 
old awards that it had not paid to a hedge fund that owned them all.  You can 
securitize almost anything.
A second related thing is that third party funders now are investing in 
quite a number of cases for investors.  This can be critical where a small-to-
medium-size investor lost its entire investment, and might not be able to 
proceed without financial support.
7RJREDFN WR WKLVJHQWOHPDQ¶VTXHVWLRQDYHU\JRRGquestion, let me 
add that sophisticated investors, particularly in infrastructure and natural 
resource concessions, look before they invest to make sure they are investing 
through an entity incorporated validly in a country that has an investment 
treaty with the host State.  It is, as I was saying yesterday, effectively 
malpractice now for advisors to investors²/corporate partners in a law firm, 
for example²not to have on the due diligence checklist a question asking if 
WKHUHLVDWUHDW\IRU³$UPDJHGGRQ´SUotection if the investment goes wrong.  
And I do mean Armageddon; these are not easy cases.
Joongi Kim: Just two things. States have very powerful incentives to 
comply with the awards voluntarily because it effects their reputation so 
most states will comply.
Lucy Reed: I do not really buy that, because investors are going back in 
Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia.  If there is oil or other resources at a deep 
enough discount, investors go back.  But it is bad for the population, because 
the terms are much worse, the protections are much higher payment 
guarantees.  It is very bad for the people of those countries.
Joongi Kim: Just to add one more thing²if it is a non-ICSID award, 
then you just go through the New York Convention.
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Lucy Reed: Like an UNCITRAL award.  We took an UNCITRAL 
award, Freshfields did, all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, for British 
Gas.  This is the first investment treaty case the Supreme Court has decided, 
and they found in favor of enforcement of the award.
Audience: In the ICSID arbitration, is there a different dynamic, as 
opposed to commercial arbitration?
Joongi Kim: Yes.  Through standard investment arbitration, the parties 
will usually choose their wings and they will agree upon the chair.  The 
difficulty is where they do not agree upon the chair.  There are various 
procedures where the institutions will try to help them, but if that does not 
work, then ultimately, if it is for ICSID to decide, they will appoint the chair.
Beomsu Kim: One thing to add is that those must be third party 
nationals.
Joongi Kim: In the case of ICSID, unless the parties agree otherwise.
Lucy Reed: There is a strict rule that the chair cannot be a national of 
any of the parties, and ICSID has certain lists from which it has to pick 
arbitrators.  The Permanent Court of Arbitration makes a lot of appointments 
as well in non-ICSID cases.  Do we think about different things in 
appointing arbitrators in treaty rather than commercial arbitrations?  Yes, we 
think about very different things including familiarity with treaty law, public 
international law, and expertise with accounting and discounted cash flow 
quantum.
Audience: It seems to be about only twenty people are historically 
appointed.
Lucy Reed: Well, each State gets to name four to its list, but they often 
name people without expertise whom ICSID cannot call upon, so there is a 
smaller list of tried and true public international arbitrators.  Too small 
actually for the ongoing good health of the system.
Audience: Most of awards that I have seen are about 150 pages.  They 
seem to be getting longer and longer.  Do you have thoughts or comments 
about that aspect?  To me it seems almost ridiculously long.
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Lucy Reed: They are longer, in part, because they are going to be 
public.  Unlike an average commercial award where the parties know the 
IDFWVWKH\NQRZWKHEDFNJURXQGDQGDOOWKH\QHHGWRNQRZLV³\RXZLQRU
\RXUGRQRWZLQ´ZLWKEDVLFUHDVRQV+HUH,WKLQNWULEXQDOVDUHDZDUHWKDW
their awards are going to be published and the people reading them will have 
no idea of what the facts were and what each side argued, yet the awards 
will be cited by parties in future arbitrations in discussions of applicable law 
and interpretation of common treaty provisions, and they are going to be 
used by future tribunals for better or worse.  There are issue conflicts.
By the way, issue conflict is another reason you see repeat ICSID 
arbitrators.  At Freshfields, we have a rule that none of our lawyers can sit as 
treaty arbitrators because of issue conflict²if you decide what an umbrella 
clause means, or unfair and inequitable treatment means in an award with 
your name on it, it can be hard to argue for your client a different way.  So 
now there is a natural evolution to where individuals are either going to be 
treaty arbitrators and FTA arbitrators, or they are going to be counsel, and 
not both, so that is narrowing the field.
Joongi Kim: Some of the submissions are a thousand pages long 
anyways.
Beomsu Kim: One thing is that there is an undermining proceeding 
about the awards that one of the reason is to make the words well-reasoned 
and well-drafted.
Lucy Reed: Let me go back to my five questions from 2007, and get 
VRPH KHOS LQ DQVZHULQJ VRPH RI WKHP  7KH ILUVW RQH LV ³ZLOO WKHUH EH
FDVHV´"7KHDQVZHULV\HVWKHUHDUH cases.  We know of maybe four.  Two 
definite cases against the Republic of Korea, and we hear of two more, and 
maybe more.  How many cases have there been by Korean investors against 
other States?
Joongi Kim: From what I know, three cases.  That is what I know.  And 
more in the pipeline apparently.
Kevin Kim: Three cases, we are representing claimants.
Lucy Reed: So you have all three?
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Joongi Kim: If they have three, then there are four, I think.
E.Y. Park: If you count those cases there are cases that are officially 
filed, there are two or three.  But there are a bunch of cases that have not 
gone as far to be filed officially, but they are in negotiation with a foreign 
sovereign or in serious discussion just before the filing and so forth.  And 
that, I think, is a great area for development.  It is interesting how it goes to 
the next level before being filed.  I know there are many big corporations 
that are hesitant to file because of various reasons.  One reason is that some 
foreign sovereigns might take it personally, then they may have difficulties.
Lucy Reed: That is absolutely one of the factors that our clients weigh.  
You have to think long and hard before you sue certain governments.  And a 
ORWRIWULJJHUOHWWHUVDUHZULWWHQDQGVHQWWRVD\³ZHKDYe a dispute starting a 
WKUHH RU VL[PRQWK FRROLQJ RII SHULRG´ ZLWK SHUKDSV QR LQWHQWLRQ RI HYHU
really pursuing the case.
7KH VHFRQG TXHVWLRQ LV ³KRZ ZLOO WKH 52. JRYHUQPHQW GHIHQG WKH
FDVHV´"  :H VHH WKH\ DUH GHIHQGLQJ WKH FDVHV TXLWH VHULRXVO\ DQG
professionally and aggressively.
7KHWKLUGLV³KRZZLOO52.LQYHVWRUVSURVHFXWHWKHFDVHV´",DPVXUH
WKH\DUHDOVRDJJUHVVLYHVHULRXVDQGSURIHVVLRQDO 7KHIRXUWKLV³DUHWKH\
XVLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDORUORFDOH[SHUWLVHRUERWK´"$V\RXKHDUGLQWKH/RQH
Star case there are Korean firms²Shin & Kim and Bae Kim & Lee for 
either side, and international firms Arnold Porter and Sidley Austin.  These 
are great teams, and we know there is a mix of international and local 
counsel in other cases.  For ROK investors, I personally would be happy to 
see only Korean law firms involved in the prosecution.  They are very 
experienced at this point with the law, and well able to do it.  But there will 
always be a factor of who is on the tribunal, in thinking whether one of the
international firms needs to come in or not.
0\ODVWTXHVWLRQZDV³ZLOOWKHIRFXVEHPRUHRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUHDW\ODZ
RU ORFDO ODZ´",QWKHFDVHVDJDLQVW WKH5HSXEOLFRI.RUHD,JXHVVWKHUHLV
more focus on international and treaty law, which is always the default 
governing law, but there will definitely be lots of Korean law.  You saw the 
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list that we were talking about²taxation issues, labor issues, governance 
issues²so there is always going to be some Korean law.
The question I would add going forward LV³DUHWKHUH.RUHDQQDWLRQDOV
WR EH QDPHG DV DUELWUDWRUV LQ LQYHVWPHQW FDVHV´"  , NQRZ RQH SHUVRQ
Professor Hi-Taek Shin, has been.  So, it is not the hermit kingdom anymore 
in this area²a very interesting area of development.
Thank you all for your attention.  I have saved my thanks for all for the 
end.  As you have heard, our Korean colleagues here are very busy people, 
and many of them are getting ready for the Lone Star hearing in May²these 
hearings are real marathons of preparation and execution.  Thanks as well to 
others, including judges and practitioners coming this afternoon.  For many 
of us, coming here shows the great respect and loyalty that we feel for 
Professor Coe and Professor Stipanowich and Pepperdine for sharing their 
ideas and their community with us over the years.  And for me, this goes to 
Jack Coe in particular, whom I met at the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, where I 
was the U.S. Agent and Jack worked for a U.S. judge.  That Tribunal, led by 
the United States and Iran, saw fit to publish all of its major awards on 
expropriation and international contract breach, which are now being used 
by so many young practitioners in investment treaty arbitration.  So we are 
always very happy to come to Pepperdine.
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